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Although the temporary injunction is a civil remedy,
available in all types of proceedings, in Tanzania it is
frequently refused in trade mark infringement disputes.
High Court of Tanzania (HCT) case law indicates the
difficulty the judges encounter in determining tempor-
ary injunctions without considering the merits of the
main suit. This difficulty is in applying the first prin-
ciple, i.e. a prima facie case with a probability of
success. This article analyses the jurisprudence of the
HCT and considers how the requirement of a prima
facie case may be satisfied. Analysis of irreparable
injury and balance of convenience, the second and
third principles for determining temporary injunction,
are beyond the purview of this review since they have
caused no substantial problems.
Part one of this article introduces the problem
presented by HCT case law covering applications for
temporary injunctions in trade mark infringement dis-
putes. Part two outlines conditions and principles that
must be fulfilled for an order of temporary injunction
to issue. Part three discusses the interaction between
these requirements and the principles governing trade
mark infringement. Part four analyses the case law
itself and identifies the flaws in the Court’s inter-
pretation of prima facie case with a probability of
success. Part five proposes a possible interpretation of
the principle of prima facie case in the context of trade
mark infringement disputes.
Conditions and principles governing
temporary injunctions
The jurisdiction of the HCT to hear applications for
temporary injunction is governed by section 68(c) and
Order 37 Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code.1
Section 68(c) generally vests in courts jurisdiction to
grant temporary injunctions. This jurisdiction may
only be exercised under the circumstances laid down in
Order 37 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code.
Section 68(c) of the Civil Procedure Code
Under section 68(c), in order to prevent the ends of
justice from being defeated the court may, subject to any
other rules, grant a temporary injunction and, in case of
disobedience, commit the party in breach as a civil pris-
oner and order that his property be attached and sold.
The provision of section 68(c) has two main limbs.
The first confers jurisdiction over courts to grant appli-
cations for temporary injunction, which may be
invoked where the Court is satisfied that the ends of
justice are at stake. Detailed preconditions which must
exist for temporary injunction to issue are provided in
Order 37 Rules 1 and 2 (discussed below). The second
limb gives power to commit any person in a civil
prison if he has disobeyed the court’s injunctive order.
This enforcement provision makes an order for tem-
porary injunction more meaningful because, otherwise,
it could be of no use for courts to issue injunctive
orders which are unenforceable.
Order 37 Rule 1
This Rule lays down alternative preconditions before a
court may consider temporary injunctions. The first is
where any property, the subject matter of the main
suit, is in danger of being wasted, damaged, or
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alienated by any party to the suit or is likely to suffer
loss of value by reason of its continued use by any
party to the suit, or wrongly sold in execution of a
decree. The second arises where a defendant threatens
or intends to remove or dispose of his property with a
view to defraud his creditors. In either situation, courts
may grant temporary injunctive relief.
Order 37 Rule 2
This Rule governs temporary injunctions where a
defendant breaches a contract or commits any other
kind of injury. In contrast with Rule 1, Rule 2 is open-
ended in the sense that it takes care of any other act
which is not specified in Rule 1 but which may simi-
larly injure the subject matter of the plaintiff ’s suit
before its determination.
Jurisdiction to issue temporary injunctions is not
absolute, being limited where relief is sought against
the Government: there the provisos to Order 37 Rules
1 and 2 oust the court’s jurisdiction. However, courts
may still make declaratory orders as to the rights of the
parties.
Principles governing issuance of
temporary injunction
The relevant principles are generally based on the
decisions and practices of English law,2 the most
important being the House of Lords case of American
Cyanamid Co. v Ethicon Ltd.3 In this case, Lord
Diplock laid down three principles which courts must
engage in exercising discretionary jurisdiction before
issuing or refusing applications for temporary injunc-
tion: (i) the application for temporary injunction must
reveal a prima facie case with a probability of success;
(ii) the applicant must then show that he would suffer
an irreparable injury if the temporary injunction is
refused; (iii) on the balance of convenience, the appli-
cant must stand to suffer more from the refusal of an
order for temporary injunction than that which the
respondent would suffer from its grant.
American Cyanamid was received in East Africa4 with
mixed judicial opinions. In Abel Salim & Others v
Okong’o & Others,5 for example, the defunct Court of
Appeal for East Africa (CAEA) expressly rejected it,
holding that the conditions for grant of an interlocutory
injunction were well settled in East Africa in Giella v
Cassman Brown and Co. Ltd.6 The conditions there were
(i) the probability of success; (ii) irreparable harm which
would not be adequately compensated for by damages;
and (iii) if in doubt, then a balance of convenience. The
Court saw no reason to depart from Giella.
After the CAEA Abel Salim, Giella became an
authoritative source for principles of temporary injunc-
tion in East Africa.7 Although Giella was cited with
approval by the Court of Appeal of Tanzania (CAT) in
CPC International Inc v Zainab Grain Millers Ltd,8 for
no apparent reasons its principles were never applied
by the Court to the facts of that case. In contrast to the
acceptance by supreme courts in East African states of
the view expressed in Abel Salim on the application of
American Cyanamid, the HCT often cited American
Cyanamid with approval. For instance, the High Court
cited American Cyanamid in CPC International Inc v
Zainab Grain Millers Ltd.9 However, it is unfortunate
that in this case the Court misdirected itself that both
American Cyanamid and Giella were decided on the
basis of the same principles. Similar faulty reasoning
was repeated by the High Court in Suryakant D. Ramji
v Savings and Finance Limited and Others10 and Gapco
Tanzania Limited and Another v Barclays Bank PLC and
Another.11 However, in N.V. Philips’ Gloeilampenfabrie-
ken v Aloyce Ngowi t/a N.M Hardware and Another12
the High Court clearly pointed out the distinction
between them: while paying attention to Giella the
High Court cited American Cyanamid with approval,
pointing out its relevance in setting the standard of
proving a prima facie case in applications for tempor-
ary injunction. As in American Cyanamid, the High
Court held that in granting temporary injunction, it is
not necessary for a plaintiff to establish the likelihood
of success.13
2 Tanzania is a common law jurisdiction. As such, English law provides one
of the sources of law: see section 2(3) of the Judicature and Application
of Laws Act, Cap. 358 RE 2002. Although this application of the English
law is subject to a reception clause, subsequent case law still offers
persuasive authority for courts in Tanzania.
3 [1975] AC 396; [1975] 1 ALL ER 504.
4 The term ‘East Africa’ is limited to the member states of the defunct East
African Community—Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda (all being common
law jurisdictions).
5 (1976) KLR 42.
6 (1973) EA 358, p. 360.
7 See CPC International Inc v Zainab Grain Millers Ltd, Civil Appeal No. 49
of 1995, CAT, Dar es Salaam (unreported); Agip (Kenya) Limited v
Appollos Kennedy Mwangi t/a Appollos Service Station [1996] eKLR;
Uganda Performing Rights Society Limited v Fred Mukubira, Misc.
Application No. 818 of 2003, High Court of Uganda (Commercial
Division), Kampala (unreported).
8 Civil Appeal No. 49 of 1995, CAT, Dar es Salaam (unreported).
9 Civil Case No. 121 of 1993, HCT, Dar es Salaam (unreported).
10 Civil Case No. 30 of 2000, HCT (Commercial Division), Dar es Salaam
(unreported).
11 Civil Case No. 117 of 2006, HCT, Dar es Salaam (unreported).
12 Commercial Case No. 38 of 2005, HCT (Commercial division), Dar es
Salaam (unreported).
13 ibid, p. 7.
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Although the HCT has repeatedly cited American
Cyanamid with approval, the CAT14 has not. However,
recently in Kenya, the Court of Appeal has considered
the application of American Cyanamid, concluding that
it was wrong to consider American Cyanamid as wholly
irrelevant in Kenya.15 This pronouncement is contrary
to the view expressed in Abel Salim by the defunct
CAEA and it is an approval of the case in Kenyan juris-
diction.
While the CAT had cited with approval Giella, the
pronouncement of the HCT in Attilio v Mbowe16 has
always been considered the source of legal principles
governing issuance of temporary injunction in
Tanzania. In Attilio, the High Court laid down three
conditions for the temporary injunction to issue:17 (i)
there must be a serious question to be tried on the
facts alleged and a probability that the plaintiff will be
entitled to the relief sought; (ii) the court’s interference
must be necessary to protect the plaintiff from the kind
of injury which may be irreparable before his legal
right is established; (iii) on the balance, there will be
greater hardship and mischief suffered by the plaintiff
from the withholding of the injunction than will be
suffered by the defendant from the granting of it.
In 1996, the CAT affirmed Attilio in Ravindra Desai &
Another v CRDB,18 just 1 year after a similar approval by
the Court in Giella. Arguably, though Giella did not
expressly cite Attilio, the later case seems to have been
inspired by the earlier one. Possibly because Attilio was
decided earlier than Giella, it has been more frequently
cited by courts in Tanzania as the authority for issuance
of temporary injunction than Giella.
In 2005, the HCT observed that Attilio was static in
that it did not well address the issue of ‘probability of
success’ in the first principle governing temporary
injunction.19 To correct this mischief, the High Court
adopted the approach in American Cyanamid.20 Since a
decision of a judge of the HCT does not bind another
judge of the same court, the HCT has continued to
harbour divergent opinions, which are considered
below.
Prima facie case
Some courts have interpreted prima facie case with a
probability of success to mean a ‘serious question to be
tried’.21 This is deemed to have been made out if an
applicant demonstrates a ‘serious question to be tried’.
What is meant by ‘a serious question’ is any question
which is not ‘frivolous or vexatious’. It is not necessary
for the applicant to demonstrate ‘a probability of
success’ at the trial. The rationale for this legal position,
said Lord Diplock, was that:
It is no part of the court’s function at this stage of the liti-
gation to try and resolve conflicts of evidence on affidavit
as to facts on which claims of either party may ultimately
depend nor to decide difficult questions of law which call
for detailed argument and mature considerations. These
are matters to be dealt with in the trial.22
Similar reasoning was followed in Lian Keow Sdn Bhd v
Overseas Credit Finance Bhd23 where His Lordship
Abbas observed that an interlocutory injunction is a
temporary and discretionary remedy. Considering
whether to grant it, the court is not concerned with the
chances of success of the appellants in proving their
civil suit at the forthcoming trial; neither is the court’s
function to evaluate the evidence and materials before
it for that purpose. The court is simply concerned with
what it has to do in the meantime in order to protect
the right of the parties so that no irreparable injury
would be caused to either of them. Further, the court
must be satisfied that there are serious questions to be
gone into in that suit, lest an application for an injunc-
tion should be made on frivolous and vexatious
grounds. This line of judicial opinion is noticeable in
some holdings of the HCT, more particularly Philips.24
In contrast, some courts have gone further, consider-
ing not only the existence of a ‘serious question to be
tried’ but also the relative strengths of the parties’
claims. In England, this principle was laid down by the
High Court in Series 5 Software,25 where Laddie J
treated a ‘probability of success’ as a separate and dis-
14 The CAT is the supreme court in the United Republic of Tanzania
(Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar).
15 See Wairimu Mureithi v City Council of Nairobi, Civil Appeal No. 5 of
1979, Court of Appeal of Kenya, Nairobi (unreported).
16 [1969] HCD 284.
17 ibid, p. 216.
18 Civil Reference Nos 2 and 3 of 1996, CAT, Dar es Salaam (unreported).
19 N.V. Philips’ Gloeilampenfabrieken v Aloyce Ngowi t/a N.M Hardware and
Another Commercial Case No. 38 of 2005, HCT (Commercial Division),
Dar es Salaam (unreported), p. 6.
20 See footnote 4 above.
21 American Cyanamid Co. v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396; [1975] 1 ALL ER
504, p. 510; see also, J Leubsdorf, ‘Preliminary Injunctions: In Defence of
the Merits’, the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper
Collection: http://ssrn.com/abstract=954733, p. 14 where the learned
author observes that in American Cyanamid, the House of Lords held
that, once the plaintiff demonstrates that there is a serious question to be
tried, the merits should not be further considered and the decision
should be based on the balance of convenience.
22 ibid.
23 [1982] 2 MLJ 162; see also Minesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v Shah
and Shah, HCCC No. 3446 of 1980; R Kuloba, Principles of Injunctions
(Oxford University Press, Nairobi, 1987), p. 49.
24 See footnote 13, above.
25 (1996) CLC 63.
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tinct criterion to the prima facie case. This approach is
also noticeable in the most recent Tanzanian case of
Isaya Mwakilasa @ Wakuvanga and Nine Others v East
Africa Television Ltd and Two Others26 (the ‘ZE
COMEDY’ case).
Irreparable injury
This is the second condition which requires the appli-
cant to show that, unless the defendant’s activity or
omission is made subject to the control or direction of
an injunction, his position will in some way be
changed for the worse: that he will suffer damage as a
consequence of the plaintiff ’s act or omission com-
plained of.27 By ‘damage’, it has been stressed that the
defendant’s actions are regarded not from the legal
point of view as being violations of a right, but simply
as a possible source of harmful practical consequences
to the applicant.28 Moreover, the applicant has to
demonstrate that the contemplated damage is not
capable of being compensated by way of damages.
Balance of convenience
This principle requires the court to establish that the
balance of convenience in the event of withholding the
relief of temporary injunction will, in all events, exceed
that of the defendant who is restrained.29
Interaction between general principles
of temporary injunction and trade mark
infringement
The purpose of temporary injunction is to preserve the
status quo pending the main suit. In the context of
trade mark disputes, the main cause of action generally
is infringement or passing-off of goods or services, or
both. Accordingly where a party seeks temporary relief
in trade mark disputes, he does so in order to restrain
an ongoing or imminent infringement. Similarly, main-
tenance of the status quo also assists a plaintiff who
succeeds in the main suit.
Consumer confusion is the yardstick of trade mark
infringement in Tanzanian law. Such confusion is pre-
sumed when the trade mark used by the alleged in-
fringer is identical to that of a trade mark owner, as
applied to identical goods or services. Identity or simi-
larity as such is not, however, determinative of trade
mark infringement since on the facts no confusion may
arise.
Analysis of trade mark infringement addresses three
main principles. First, one must investigate whether the
trade marks are identical or similar. One next asks
whether such trade marks have been used in relation to
identical or similar goods or services. Finally, is the
identity or similarity between the trade marks likely to
cause confusion to consumers as to the source of
origin of goods or services?
From this analysis, it can be argued that the first and
second principles governing trade mark infringement
are determinants of the first principle of temporary
injunction, the prima facie case. This is so because
where trade marks are identical or similar and have
been applied to identical or similar goods or services,
there is a strongly arguable case of trade mark infringe-
ment. Unless there are other reasons which may affect
a finding of likelihood of confusion, a plaintiff is likely
to succeed in the main suit. The temporary injunction
should therefore issue where trade marks and goods or
services upon which such marks are applied are identi-
cal or similar, unless on account of irreparable injury
or balance of convenience the court finds in favour of a
defendant.
High Court case law
The most challenging issue broached by the High
Court’s decisions lies on the interpretation of the first
principle. As previously mentioned, the scope of this
principle is still uncertain. As a result, the HCT is split
into two schools of thought. One believes that prima
facie case with a probability of success must be con-
strued as a ‘serious question to be tried’,30 the issue of
‘probability of success’ being irrelevant since it leads to
prejudging the merits of the case. The other sees the
principle as having two distinct criteria:31 (i) prima
facie case and (ii) ‘probability of success’. The former is
26 Commercial Case No. 46 of 2008, HCT (Commercial Division), Dar es
Salaam (unreported).
27 Kuloba, Op cit, p. 50.
28 ibid.
29 BM Prasad, Mulla, The Code of Civil Procedure (Butterworths, New Delhi,
17th edn, vol. 4, 2007), p. 265.
30 See eg C.P.C International Inc. v Zainabu Grain Millers Ltd, Civil Case
No. 121 of 1993, HCT, Dar es Salaam (unreported), p. 15.
31 See, for example, C.P.C International Inc. v Zainabu Grain Millers Ltd,
Civil Appeal No. 47 of 1995, CAT, Dar es Salaam (unreported), p. 7;
Colgate Palmolive Company v Zakaria Provision Stores and 3 Others, Civil
Case No. 1 of 1997, HCT, Dar es Salaam (unreported), p. 2; Tanzania
Breweries Ltd v Kibo Breweries Ltd and Kenya Breweries Ltd, Civil case No.
34 of 1999, HCT, Dar es Salaam (unreported), p. 5; Glaxo Group Limited
v Agri-Vet Limited, Commercial Case No. 73 of 2002, HCT (Commercial
Division), Dar es Salaam (unreported), p. 9; Agro Processing and Allied
Products Limited v Said Salim Bakhresa & Co. Ltd, Commercial Case No.
31 of 2004, HCT (Commercial Division), Dar es Salaam (unreported),
p. 3; Tanzania Cigarette Tobacco Co. Limited v Iringa Tobacco Co. Limited,
Commercial Case No. 12 of 2005, HCT (Commercial Division), Dar es
Salaam (unreported), p. 6; and Isaya Mwakilasa @ Wakuvanga and Nine
Others v East Africa Television Ltd and Two Others, Commercial Case No.
Alex B. Makulilo . Temporary injunctions in trade marks ARTICLE 569
 by on August 2, 2010 
http://jiplp.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
construed similarly to the first school of thought, while
the latter refers to the relative strength of a case.
In Philips,32 the HCT reformulated the first principle
of temporary injunction somewhat confusingly. The
High Court, while citing Attilio, erroneously stated that
an applicant has first to show that ‘there are serious
questions to be determined by the court’ and that a
prima facie case has been established.33 Here the cri-
teria are a ‘serious question to be tried’ and a prima
facie case. The High Court did not further explain
what is meant by prima facie case. It is doubtful if
prima facie case in this formulation also means a
‘serious question to be tried’. This is because a ‘serious
question to be tried’, which stands for prima facie case
in the first and second schools of thought, is the first
criterion of the principle in this formulation while
‘probability of success’ is the second. While the High
Court restated this principle as in the first school of
thought,34 it is arguable that the two formulations
create further uncertainties in the Court’s jurispru-
dence.
Ordinarily, the standard of proof in a civil case is
the ‘balance of probability’. This requires a
plaintiff to establish his case beyond 50 per cent
Another issue that has become a subject of contro-
versy in the High Court’s jurisprudence is the required
standard of proof of prima facie case with a probability
of success. Ordinarily, the standard of proof in a civil
case is the ‘balance of probability’. This requires a
plaintiff to establish his case beyond 50 per cent.35 The
question is whether a proof of prima facie case with a
probability of success must pass the ‘balance of
probability’ test.
The earliest High Court holdings, illustrated by
C.P.C International Inc. v Zainabu Grain Millers Ltd,36
addressed very diffusely the issue of standard of proof
in temporary injunctions. In this case, for example, the
Court pointed out that the burden of satisfying the
Court that there has been trade mark infringement or
passing-off rests upon the plaintiff.37 To discharge this
burden, it is sufficient if the plaintiff can show that
there is an arguable case against the defendant.38
Moreover, the plaintiff must show that continuance of
the defendant’s activities until the trial is likely to cause
substantial damage to him which is irreparable in the
sense that it will not be compensated by an order for
damages at the trial.39 Applying this standard, his
Lordship Mwaikasu held that the application for an
interlocutory injunction failed because the plaintiff did
not prove both infringement and passing-off.
An analysis of C.P.C International reveals contradic-
tions which arise from the Court’s treatment of the
principles for temporary injunction within the context
of trade mark infringement and passing-off, since the
Court abandoned application of the principles of tem-
porary injunction and engaged the likelihood of con-
fusion test, the test for trade mark infringement. The
latter test attracts proof to a ‘balance of probability’
which is applicable in the main suit.
When C.P.C International went on appeal, the CAT 40
found two errors in the decision. First, the judge erred
in law in determining the application for temporary
injunction by deciding issues which should have been
resolved and determined at the trial of the main suit.
Second, he misdirected himself on the principles relating
to the grant of temporary injunction.
Addressing the first issue, Lubuva, J.A, held that the
trial judge exceeded the scope necessary for determi-
nation of interim injunctions,41 observing that, in
dealing with the proceedings for an interlocutory
injunction, the judge was in effect trying the main suit,
at a stage which had not been reached.
As regards the second issue, the Court of Appeal
held that, in all cases involving the grant of temporary
injunctions, the applicable principles are the same. In
the light of these principles, what was expected of the
judge was to consider whether, on the facts as disclosed
from affidavits and pleadings, a prima facie case had
been shown: it was thus premature for him to require
the appellant to prove infringement or passing-off.
After setting aside the ruling and order of the lower
court, the Court of Appeal granted the application for
temporary injunction as a matter of course and
without consideration of the principles governing
46 of 2008, HCT (Commercial Division), Dar es Salaam (unreported),
p. 4.
32 Commercial Case No. 38 of 2005, HCT (Commercial division), Dar es
Salaam (unreported).
33 ibid, p. 2.
34 See p. 7 of the High Court’s holding in Philips.
35 By contrast, in criminal proceedings, the prosecution must prove its case
beyond reasonable doubt—a higher standard than ‘balance of
probability’.
36 Civil Case No. 121 of 1993, HCT, Dar es Salaam (unreported).
37 ibid, p. 15.
38 ibid.
39 ibid.
40 C.P.C International Inc. v Zainabu Grain Millers Ltd, Civil Appeal No. 49
of 1995, CAT, Dar es Salaam (unreported).
41 ibid, p. 5.
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temporary injunction. One would have expected the
Court to reconsider the application in the light of the
principles for issuance of temporary injunction.
However, this was not the case.
In Colgate Palmolive,42 the High Court stated that
the prima facie rule does not require that the Court
should examine the material before it closely and come
to a conclusion that the plaintiff has a case in which he
is likely to succeed, for to do so would amount to pre-
judging the case on its merits.43 The effect of this
holding is that it lowers the standard of proof in tem-
porary injunctions below the ‘balance of probability’
standard. Although in this case the Court granted tem-
porary relief, its analysis shifted to assessment of trade
mark infringement. For example, having found that
there were similarities between the appearance of
COLGATE and ABC Dent products, the High Court
held that there was a real likelihood of confusion of
consumers.44 Arguably, assessment of confusion entails
an engagement of the likelihood of confusion test.
Similarly, determination of likelihood of confusion
requires that a plaintiff proves his case on a ‘balance of
probability’.
In Colgate Palmolive, the HCT also laid down the
test for similarities between contested trade marks:
one must compare the whole of the plaintiff ’s
mark and get-up with the whole of the defendant’s
mark and get-up to see whether there are
similarities which go to create or show the
prospects of confusion and actual deception
In Colgate Palmolive, the HCT also laid down the test
for similarities between contested trade marks: one
must compare the whole of the plaintiff ’s mark and
get-up with the whole of the defendant’s mark and get-
up to see whether there are similarities which go to
create or show the prospects of confusion and actual
deception.45 As to the standard of proof of such simi-
larities, this is a consumer of average intelligence with
an imperfect recollection.46 Subsequently, in Tanzania
Breweries Ltd v Kibo Breweries Ltd and Kenya Breweries
Ltd,47 Justice Kalegeya expressed strong disagreement
with Justice Mapigano as to the standard of proof of
similarity. Justice Kalegeya’s reasoning was that here one
deals with an increasingly poor recollection in an ordin-
ary person with the progressive consumption of the
product.48 In contrast, the learned judge held that the
Court has to wear the shoes of a ‘common man’, spread
the two marks before it, and ask itself whether there are
resemblances between the two which would make it pick
a product which was not intended but the opposite.49 In
a course of its finding, the High Court shifted its analysis
from a ‘common man’ standard to a ‘common beer con-
sumer’ and finally to an ‘ordinary person’.
Unsurprisingly, the Court failed to analyse systemat-
ically the terms ‘common man’, ‘common beer consu-
mer’, and ‘ordinary person’. An immediate question
which arises here is whether these terminologies refer
to the same standard and are thus synonymous. Argu-
ably, they are not. In a regulatory context, the terms
‘common man’ and ‘ordinary person’ as referred in
Tanzania Breweries suggest cognitive ability as opposed
to the ‘common beer consumer’ which makes reference
to a relevant market for a product for which contested
trade marks are used. In our context, this is specifically
a beer market. However, where the products and ser-
vices are widely prevalent so that everybody purchases
them, the relevant market can be equated with the
population at large.50 The rationale in favour of
the imperfect recollection standard emanates from the
impossibility of perfect recall of the product a consu-
mer purchases. And where competing goods are not
sold side-by-side, the consumer has no chance to
inspect the trade marks closely.
In Tanzania Breweries, the HCT also expressed the
difficulty of proving a prima facie case at a stage when
no evidence has yet been adduced.51 The apparent
acceptance that no evidence is required at the interlocu-
tory stage is erroneous, because Order 37 Rule 1 expli-
citly requires support by affidavit or otherwise. The
proper question may be what amount of evidence is
required to prove temporary injunction? However, not-
withstanding this difficulty, the HCT granted temporary
injunction in Kibo Match Group Limited v Mohamed
Enterprises (T) Limited52 as a matter of course and
without any thoughtful analysis. Both Tanzania
42 Civil Case No. 1 of 1997, HCT, Dar es Salaam (unreported).
43 ibid, p. 2.
44 ibid, p. 3.
45 ibid, p. 3.
46 ibid.
47 Civil Case No. 34 of 1999, HCT, Dar es Salaam (unreported).
48 ibid, p. 8.
49 ibid.
50 J Phillips, Trade Mark Law: A Practical Anatomy (Oxford University Press,
New York, 2003), p. 353.
51 Tanzania Breweries Ltd v Kibo Breweries Ltd and Kenya Breweries Ltd,
Civil Case No. 1 of 1997, HCT, Dar es Salaam (unreported), p. 6.
52 Civil case No. 6 of 1999, HCT (Commercial Division), Dar es Salaam
(unreported).
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Breweries and Kibo Match were decided by the same
judge, so one would have expected more consistency.
In Kibo Match, an action for trade mark infringe-
ment, the plaintiff, proprietor of the KANGAROO
trade mark for matchboxes it sold, objected to the
importation and sale by the defendant of match boxes
bearing the identical trade mark. The plaintiff sought
interim relief. In granting a temporary injunction,
finding for the plaintiff on the prima facie case prin-
ciple, the High Court considered three factors:
(i) The plaintiff ’s registered trade mark was prima
facie valid. (The Court avoided comment on the
defendant’s evidence that it commenced importa-
tion of KANGAROO matchboxes the year before
the plaintiff ’s registration, as was its submission
that the registration had expired.) Arguably, it was
an error on the part of the Court to grant tempor-
ary injunction while the validity of the plaintiff ’s
trade mark was itself in issue. This argument is
supported by the High Court’s own holding in
Tanzania Cigarette Company Limited v Mastermind
Tobacco (T) Limited,53 where Justice Massati was
prepared to hold that a proprietor of an unregis-
tered trade mark has the right to prevent others
from using an identical or similar trade mark
through an action of tort of passing-off.54 Stated
differently, a registered trade mark does not over-
ride a prior right of use of an unregistered trade
mark merely because the former is registered.
Defence counsel, however, failed to raise such
counter-claim.
(ii) The plaintiff ’s use of the trade mark is taken into
consideration. However, the Court did not con-
sider the defendant’s prior use of the trade mark
in question.
(iii) Is the defence based on the merits or on technical
grounds? In the Court’s opinion, the latter
amounts to an admission of the allegations. This
may be erroneous. A temporary injunction is a
discretionary remedy, granted only after the Court
is satisfied that there are compelling reasons for it.
The fact that a defendant has not challenged the
merit of an application, or has even failed to
appear on the day of hearing, are not such com-
pelling reasons. The Court also confused the rules
on pleadings with counsels’ submissions. In the
former, a defendant’s admission of the plaintiff ’s
allegations is deemed the moment he does not tra-
verse any of the allegations in the plaint or, the
defendant has totally failed to file a written state-
ment of defence. The High Court mistakenly
extended the rule on defendant’s admission in
pleadings to counsel’s submission.
Consistent with Tanzania Breweries was the Court’s
holding in Glaxo Group Limited v Agri-Vet Limited.55
There the plaintiff sued for trade mark infringement
and passing-off, alleging that it was a registered pro-
prietor of the trade mark COFTA which it used on
cough and cold tablets. Subsequently, the defendant
registered a trade mark COFEX and began selling the
same tablets as the plaintiff, using similar trade dress.
Before trial, the plaintiff sought to restrain the defend-
ant from trading in this fashion pending the trial.
In his decision, Justice Kalegeya made two important
statements. As these statements have been repeatedly
approved in subsequent HCT decisions, I reproduce
them verbatim. The first reiterated the difficulty in
establishing prima facie case with a probability of
success and also set the standard of proof:
I should outrightly observe that this is the trickiest prin-
ciple among the three upon which the court has to exercise
great care before making a finding. Why? As I had an
occasion to observe in Commercial case No.5 of 1999,
Tanzania Tea Packers Ltd v The Commissioner of Income
Tax and Another, “ . . . although Attilio case shows that
there should exist a probability of applicant’s success in the
main matter, in my view, this should not be interpreted to
mean that the facts at hand should declare the applicant a
winner. To conclude as such would be to pre-empt the
trial and would militate against the basic principles of
justice. It will be tantamount to pre-judging parties before
they are heard on the controversy. In my view therefore,
what is meant is that the applicant should show that
though evidence has not been given, the allegations so far
made by him, prima facie, portray him as having been
aggrieved by the respondent entitling him to the reliefs
being sought in the main suit.”56
The second removed any possibility for the plaintiff to
prove the first principle of temporary injunction:
My views are that in conflicts of trade marks and business
names, temporary injunctions should very sparingly be
sought by parties and granted by courts because of the
intricacy surrounding the first principle of establishment
of a prima facie case with a probability of success. I am
saying so because I fail to see how the plaintiff/applicant
53 Commercial Case No. 11 of 2005, HCT (Commercial Division), Dar es
Salaam (unreported).
54 ibid, pp. 38–40; see also, section 30 of the Trade and Service Marks Act,
Cap. 326 RE 2002.
55 Commercial Case No. 73 of 2002 HCT (Commercial Division), Dar es
Salaam (unreported).
56 ibid, p. 10.
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can establish a prima facie case with a probability of success
without going into details of what he alleges to be passing-
offs or infringement and in turn without the court analysing
what is submitted and being of those allegations.57
These two statements demonstrate an enormous con-
tradiction in the learned judge’s observations. In the
first statement, the learned judge attempted to keep the
threshold for proof of prima facie case with a prob-
ability of success at a minimum level, which logically
implies that an applicant may easily meet the legal test.
Yet in his second statement, the learned judge raised
the standard of proof too high. In fact, he effectively
abolished interim injunctive relief for trade mark
infringement and passing-off when he stressed that
there is no possibility for an applicant of temporary
injunction to establish a prima facie case with a prob-
ability of success without going into details of what is
alleged to be passing-off or infringement.
It is arguable that similarity between trade marks
is the most important factor to which the High
Court has to pay considerable weight in assessing
whether a prima facie case is established
Moreover in both Tanzania Breweries and Glaxo
Group, the High Court ignored the fact that contested
trade marks were similar or dissimilar. Thus in Tanza-
nia Breweries, the High Court found that the contested
trade marks were dissimilar. However, this was the
basis for the Court’s refusal to find that prima facie
case with a probability of success had been established.
Later in the Glaxo Group, the Court found that there
were similarities between the marks, yet the Court did
not find the plaintiff to have successfully established
prima facie case with a probability of success. It is
arguable that similarity between trade marks is the
most important factor to which the High Court has to
pay considerable weight in assessing whether a prima
facie case is established.
The reluctance to grant temporary injunction in
Tanzania Breweries and Glaxo Group was extended in
Agro Processing.58 There the complaint was that the
defendant was passing off goods by using the word
POA, the plaintiff ’s trade mark. To protect the status
quo, the plaintiff sought to restrain the defendant from
using the word POA in labelling, advertising, selling,
distributing, circulating, or otherwise, in relation to
food flour milled, packed, sold, distributed, circulated,
or otherwise by the defendant. Refusing the plaintiff ’s
application, the High Court held that it is extremely
difficult to determine whether a prima facie case exists
in this case without going to the merits.59 The Court
cited with approval the Glaxo Group.
Glaxo Group was further extended in Tanzania
Tobacco Co. Limited v Iringa Tobacco Co. Limited,60 where
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was trading in
trade marks closely similar and resembling the plaintiff ’s
marks. Both parties had registered their trade marks for
cigarettes. Refusing temporary relief, the High Court
reiterated the difficulty of establishing a prima facie case,
citing Glaxo Group and Agro Processing. Said the Court,
this application was unsuitable for an order of temporary
injunction since it would be difficult to lay demarcation
lines between matters to be considered for temporary
relief without prejudging the main suit.
The High Court equated the facts in Agro Processing
with those of Tanzania Tobacco, possibly a reason why
the Court followed that case. Surprisingly, the High
Court was silent on how the facts in Agro Processing
were similar to Tanzania Tobacco for, in Agro Processing,
the word trade mark POA was in dispute by the con-
tending parties, while in Tanzania Tobacco the dispute
centred on colour arrangement, get-ups, and size of the
logos. It is difficult to comprehend how the Court was
able to equate the facts of the two cases, one involving
conceptual similarity and the other visual similarity,
where the criteria for comparison are different.61
After Tanzania Tobacco, the High Court decided
Philips. Unlike previous cases, Philips discussed clearly
the relevance of American Cyanamid in the Tanzanian
legal system. The most important point raised in this
holding is that the proof of ‘probability of success’ as
required in Attilio was unnecessary. However, Philips
has its shortcomings. First, although Justice Massati
57 ibid, p. 14.
58 Commercial Case No. 31 of 2004 HCT (Commercial Division), Dar es
Salaam (unreported).
59 ibid, p. 6.
60 Commercial Case No. 12 of 2005 HCT (Commercial Division), Dar es
Salaam (unreported).
61 In Pianotist’s Application (1906) 23 RPC 774 at 777, J Parker laid down a
principle in comparison of word trade marks as follows. ‘You must take
the two words. You must judge of them, both by their look and by their
sound. You must consider the goods to which they are to be applied. You
must consider the nature and kind of customer who would be likely to
buy those goods. In fact, you must consider all the circumstances; and
you must further consider what is likely to happen if each of those trade
marks is used in a normal way as a trade mark for the goods of the
respective owners of marks.’ Later in Sabel v Puma, Case C-251/95 [1995]
ETMR 1, the European Court of Justice held that the comparison of
trade marks should involve a global appreciation of the visual, aural, or
conceptual similarity of the marks in question, bearing in mind, in
particular, their distinctive and dominant components.
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cited some earlier cases, he failed to distinguish their
facts from those in Philips. He held that Tanzania
Tobacco was distinguishable from Philips, but no factual
distinctions between the two cases were drawn. More-
over, the High Court did not comment on other
decisions cited by the parties.
Although the High Court granted temporary relief
in Philips, it failed to provide thorough analysis of the
first principle of temporary injunction. Let us repro-
duce the observations of the Court verbatim:
Applying those principles in the present case and going
through . . . the Applicant’s affidavit and . . . the counter-
affidavit I am satisfied that the Applicant has managed to
establish an arguable case of infringement.62
The Court then observed:
There is also no dispute that the Applicant is the registered
owner of the trade mark PHILIPS and since courts are
here to enforce the provisions of the law I am also satisfied
that the Court’s interference is necessary, not only to
protect the plaintiff from irreparable injury but also to
enforce the law.
It is arguable that a mere statement, ‘ . . . going through
. . . the Applicant’s affidavit and . . . the counter-affidavit
I am satisfied that the Applicant has managed to estab-
lish an arguable case of infringement’, does not suffice
to clearly show what the learned judge had considered
to find existence of an arguable case of infringement.
The judge was supposed to synthesize the contentious
facts disclosed in the affidavit and counter-affidavit
within the principles of temporary injunction.
Undoubtedly, this analysis had remained in the judge’s
mind, as his ruling does not contain any line of reason-
ing towards his conclusion. There is therefore an appar-
ent disconnection between the stated law and its
application in the case.
Similarly, the High Court has apparently taken into
account that the applicant was a registered owner of
the trade mark PHILIPS. While it is admitted that
registration creates a presumption as to the validity of
ownership,63 registration as such is insufficient to con-
stitute an arguable case of infringement since even the
proprietor of an unregistered trade mark may sue a
proprietor of a registered trade mark for passing-off.64
This view was expressed by Massati J himself in
Tanzania Cigarette Company Limited v Mastermind
Tobacco (T) Limited.65 It is surprising that the holding
in Tanzania Cigarette contradicts Philips. In Tanzania
Cigarette, Massati J was prepared to hold that, where
an application for trade mark used by a proprietor is
pending with the registrar and a subsequent trade mark
becomes registered while the earlier application is still
pending, such registered trade mark does not override
the prior rights of use of the pending application. The
learned judge then went so far as to deem such
pending application a trade mark already in the regis-
ter. However, section 32(4) of the Trade and Service
Marks Act clearly provides that the exclusive right of
use conferred on a registered trade mark in section 31
of the Trade and Service Marks shall not be deemed
to be infringed where two or more registered trade
marks are identical or nearly resemble each other. It is
therefore erroneous to accept registration of the appli-
cant’s trade mark as evidence of an arguable case of
infringement without considering the defendant’s title.
Isaya Mwakilasa is the latest High Court decision.
There, the Court reiterated its position in the
Glaxo Group and Agro Processing
Isaya Mwakilasa66 is the latest High Court decision.
There, the Court reiterated its position in the Glaxo
Group and Agro Processing. In brief, the plaintiffs were
comedians performing under the auspice of East Africa
Television Ltd, the first defendant. Throughout, the
plaintiffs used the name ZE COMEDY with permission
from the National Arts Council of Tanzania. This
permit was for 1 year. Subsequently, the first defendant
applied to register a trade mark ZE COMEDY with the
second defendant, the Registrar of Trade and Service
Marks. This application was still pending. After expiry
of their contract with the first defendant, the plaintiffs
entered a new contract with Tanzania Broadcasting
Corporation to air their performances using the same
trade name, ZE COMEDY. This was disputed by the
first defendant, as well as the second and third defen-
dants as regulatory bodies. Before trial, the plaintiffs
sought orders for temporary injunction against the
defendants to restrain them from interfering, disturb-
ing, and preventing them from conducting their
business in the name and design known as ZE
COMEDY pending hearing of the suit. In a 26-page
ruling, the HCT (Madame Justice Oriyo) extensively
62 ibid, p. 8.
63 See section 50(1) of the Trade and Service marks Act, Cap. 326 RE 2002.
64 ibid, section 30.
65 Commercial Case No. 11 of 2005 HCT (Commercial Division), Dar es
Salaam (unreported).
66 See footnote 28, above.
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dealt with one issue: had the plaintiffs/applicants estab-
lished a prima facie case with a probability of success?
The High Court held that there were triable issues.67
However, the chances of the plaintiff succeeding were
non-existent.68 The Court’s reasoning was based on the
fact that, since no status quo was in existence at the
time of institution of the suit, no temporary injunction
could issue. Let us consider the Court’s analysis.
The Court found that when the suit was filed,
neither the plaintiffs nor the first defendant were
using the mark ZE COMEDY. Hence neither the
applicants nor the first respondent had exclusive right
of use or protection. When the present suit was filed,
the first respondent had applied to be registered as
owner of the trade mark, ZE COMEDY. However,
such application was still under the registration
process with the second respondent. Meanwhile, the
applicants had a permit to perform as ZE COMEDY
PRODUCTION from the National Arts Council. This
permit was for 12 months, but had expired a month
earlier. There was therefore no status quo on the date
of institution of the action which was worthy of pres-
ervation by the injunction.
The Court’s reasoning was based on the fact that,
since no status quo was in existence at the time
of institution of the suit, no temporary injunction
could issue.
Two issues must be considered here. First, what is
the status of a pending registration for a trade mark?
Second, what is the status of an expired name regis-
tered under the National Arts Council Act in the
context of the Trade and Service Marks Act? In
Tanzania Cigarette, the High Court stretched the defi-
nition of the term ‘already in the register’ in section
20(1) of the Trade and Service Marks Act69 to include
trade marks of which the registration was pending
with the Registrar.70 The rationale for this is to afford
protection on pending applications which might other-
wise be superseded by registration of identical or
similar trade marks by a competitor. This would also
make section 28 of the Trade and Service Marks Act
with respect to the date of registration of a trade mark
meaningful.71 This being the case then, it is arguable
that the status quo of the first defendant at the time of
institution of the suit was that the first defendant was
deemed to be already in the register as against any
competing interest. Hence the High Court’s holding
was wrong.
What, next, was the status of the plaintiffs after
expiry of their 12-month permit from the National
Arts Council to perform as ZE COMEDY PRO-
DUCTION? Does such expiry relinquish the plaintiffs’
prior rights of use over the name ZE COMEDY PRO-
DUCTION? What could be the position if the plaintiffs
did not at all register their group with the National
Arts Council as ZE COMEDY PRODUCTION? These
questions were not considered by the Court.
While the plaintiffs registered ZE COMEDY PRO-
DUCTION under the National Arts Council Act,72
this did not constitute a registered trade mark under
the Trade and Service Marks Act. However, such
registration could qualify as an unregistered trade
mark because it was actually used by the plaintiffs.
The expiry of the permit therefore could not affect
this status because, even if the plaintiffs had not
registered their group by the National Arts Council
but actually used the name ZE COMEDY PRO-
DUCTION, that could be sufficient to acquire protec-
tion under section 30 of the Trade and Service Marks
Act. Even if ZE COMEDY PRODUCTION was a
registered trade mark, its expiry could not have auto-
matically relinquished the plaintiffs’ prior right of
use.73 Accordingly, the first defendant’s act of apply-
67 ibid, p. 13.
68 ibid.
69 Cap. 326 RE 2002.
70 Section 20(1) of the Trade and Service Marks Act, Cap. 326 RE 2002:
‘Subject to the provisions of subsection (2) trade or service mark cannot
be validly registered in respect of any goods or services if it is identical
with a trade or service mark belonging to a different proprietor and
already on the register in respect of the same goods or services or closely
related goods or services or that so nearly resembles that a trade or
service mark as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion.’
71 Section 28(1) of the Trade and Service Marks Act, Cap. 326 RE 2002:
‘When an application for registration of a trade or service mark has been
accepted under either(a) the application has not been opposed and the
time of opposition has expired; or (b) the application has been opposed
and the opposition has been decided in favour of the applicant, the
Registrar shall, unless the application has been accepted in error, register
the trade or service mark, and the trade or service mark, when registered,
shall be registered as of the date on which the application for registration
was received, and that date shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to
be the date of registration.’
72 Cap. 204 RE 2002.
73 Section 29(1) of the Trade and Service Marks Act, Cap. 326 RE 2002: ‘the
registration of a trade or service mark shall be for the period of seven
years from the date of registration but may be renewed from time to time
in accordance with the provisions of this section.’ Further in section
29(4) of the same Act it is provided that ‘Where the registration of a
trade or service mark has expired through non-payment of the fee for
renewal or otherwise, that trade or service mark shall nevertheless, for the
purpose of any application for registration of a trade or service mark
during the year following the date of expiration, be deemed to be a trade
or service mark that is already on the register . . . ’ See also D Ngassa ‘A
Short Guide to Trademark Law in Tanzania and Zanzibar’ http://www.
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ing to register ZE COMEDY PRODUCTION as a
trade mark could not affect the plaintiffs’ prior right
of use. The High Court was accordingly also wrong
as regards the status quo of the plaintiffs at the time
of the institution of the suit.
The High Court considered a further reason in
refusing the plaintiffs’ application: there were
similarities between the application for temporary
injunction and the plaintiffs’ prayers in the plaint.74
Arguably, the High Court went too far. First, the
prayers in the application and main suit are dis-
tinguishable. In the application, the plaintiffs prayed
for an order of temporary injunction to restrain the
defendants from interfering, disturbing, and/or pre-
venting the plaintiffs from conducting their business in
the name and design as ZE COMEDY pending hearing
of the main suit.75 However, the main prayer in the
main suit is permanent and perpetual injunction
restraining the first defendant from interfering with the
business of the plaintiffs in any manner.76 Second,
similarities or differences in the prayers in the appli-
cation for temporary injunction and those in the main
suit do not fall in any of the conditions or principles
governing temporary injunction.
Marked reluctance
An overview of the jurisprudence of the HCT indicates
that the Court has been reluctant to grant applications
for temporary injunction in trade mark infringement
disputes. The justification for this reluctance is that it
is impossible for a plaintiff to satisfy the prima facie
case with a probability of success without crossing into
the merits of the main suit. At the same time, it has
been difficult for the Court to determine whether a
plaintiff has met the requirement of the first principle
without touching the merits of the suit.
However, the High Court had granted temporary
injunction in Colgate Palmolive, Kibo Match, and
Philips. In Colgate Palmolive, the Court considered two
factors namely, similarity and likelihood of confusion
while in Kibo Match it took into account the fact that
the plaintiff was a registered proprietor of the trade
mark in issue. In Philips, no reason was disclosed. In
C.P.C International, the CAT granted temporary injunc-
tion as a matter of course after a refusal by the High
Court. The Court did not consider the application in
any of the principles of temporary injunction.
It is clear that there are problems with the High
Court’s jurisprudence. The Court has often considered
extraneous factors in granting or refusing interim injunc-
tive reliefs. I argue that in trade mark infringement dis-
putes prima facie case may be satisfied the moment the
Court finds that contested trade marks are similar. The
rationale for this interpretation is that where trade marks
are similar, an arguable case for infringement is estab-
lished. The Court should not go so far as to consider
whether such similarity may likely cause confusion to
consumers. The reason is that likelihood of confusion is
the test for trade mark infringement.
lexglobelaw.com/assets/guide_trade mark2.pdf (accessed on 27 December
2009).
74 See Isaya Mwakilas’s ruling (above) p. 21.
75 ibid, p. 2.
76 ibid, pp. 21–22.
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